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I.  Today,  F'ebru~ry 11th,  is  an  anniversary.  Three  years  ago  exactly_, 
in  a  joint declaration the  EEC  and  the  United  States  committed  themselves 
to begin  and  to  aJ.:tively support  wide-ranging multilateral negotiations 
ln the  GA_TT  frar::e\vork."('nw  days  earlier,  on  9th  Februe:t:cy,  Japan  and  UY"Li ted 
States  had  jointly  decl~red but  they  had  accepted  a  similar corruni tment .) 
Three  yea.r3  h~rve  passed during vhich  a  certain  num~er of obSt3cles 
have  had  to  be  overcome.  In parb cular it vas  necessary to  ivai t  for  the 
introduction of  the  Tra.de  Act  a.nd  its  passaGe  through  the  Cm1gress  to  a 
final vote.  The  ;:;;;~c  -~velcomes  the fact  that  tbis  legislative process  is  no;.; 
co1nplet:e  sin.ce  t}Jl.s  n1eans  tha~.t  effecti'.r~ :negotiations  cc;.rl  n.O':l  bcgir1,  as 
\vas  foreseen  in the  Tokyo  H:i_nisteri.al  DecL:u~a.tion vhich,  I  ne:::cl 
hardly  add,  the  EEC  continues  to resprd  as  the  agreed basis  for  this 
negotiat:icm. 
e:;.nd  tile  'l'o}:::,'o  DccLu·at ion !'efc:rred to  this.  We  hope  U::a.t  the  recen.t 
dec:i~;ions  of  the  IHF  open  the  way  to  a  re::J.J.  reE·orm  of  the  intcrn'3.tior:.:3.:~ 
moneta.ry  s::,rstern. 
F'rom  197 3  on other  changes  beca"ne  a.pparen t,  Hl  pdrti  cul  ar in  the~ 
trade  in pr'jmary products  vi}Jich  1rras  subject  to extensive va:2iations  in 
price  CtYlC1 .  d;~·a.rn-:."~ti.::..:  policy ini  tiati'Te3 by  gr01).pS  of  prod\A.cing  cou:1tries .  . 
As  l"<::sul t  of  the  de.'..relopw~"c"it.S  in the field of  petroleum  procb.cts  a  number 
of  count:r·.i.es  :ha.ve  faced  se2ious  balance  of  payrn.ents  cliffic-!Al ties. 
III.  All  U;esrc:  deve1opnents  should  be  taken into  account  during  tl'K" 
CJJ1.}'  a.l tera~ion 
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from  the start.  On  the  contrary in our view we  have  to redouble  our 
efforts  to maintain  and  improve  world  trading relationships  on  as  free 
and  as  open  a  basis  as  possible.  In this  context  this negotiation is  of 
importance  because  the  simple fact  that it is  beeing undertaken will 
serve  as  a  deterrent  to  isolationist  a~d protectionist  tendencies. 
The  Community  reaffirms its commitment to such free  and  open  trading 
relationships  as  well  as  to the  international rules  and  procedures  of  the 
GATT.  In particular we  continue  to attach  importance  to  the  concept  of 
overall reciprocity which  must  forM  the basis  of  these negotiations 
between  the main  industrialised participants. 
IV.  It is  true that  the relative weigbtingof  the various  problems  has 
somewhat  altered.  Since  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War  we  have  been used 
to  thinking in terms  of market  access,  to finding outlets for  our  products: 
now  the  problem  of obtaining a  sure supply  of  raw materiaJs and  of  energy 
supplies  is  at least  as  important.  As  regards  food  supplies  \-le  have  moved 
from  a  period of excess  of  supplv  over  demand  at world  level to  3 
situation which  is rather  the  reverse  and it is  only  too  eh.sy  to recognize 
a  failure  of supply  to meet  demand  in a  certain number  of areas.  These 
are  tvro  clear examples  but there are  others. 
V.  We  believe  therefore that  we  will  have  to up-date  the  frarnevmrk 
within which negotiations  take  place without  changing  the basic objectives. 
In other \vords  the  Community  believes  that  the  goal  of  liberalising 
and  eventually  expanding trade will  be  more  easily achieved if the multi-
lateral trade negotiations  find their place  in the  context of overall 
policies  at  international level  designed to meet  the  present  crisis in 
the  world  economy. 
In this  respect it is difficult not  to mention  the  discussions  which 
are  takingplace or \-!ill  take  place  in coming  months  in other bodies  where 
all the  trading nations)and particularly the  developing  countries~have 
fundamental  interests  to protect.  The  Comrnuni ty reaffirms  that  these 
countries  are  partners  with full rights  in these negotiations.  They  have 
the  chance  to  make  their contribution to  the  smooth running of  inte:cnatimu~ 
trade  exchanges  <md  to  the  growth  of such  exchanges> without  this contri-
bution being  inconsistent  with their development  needs.  The  EEC  is 
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determined for its part  to seek solutions  which  can bring real  improvements 
to the  economies  and  trade  of developing countries  in the  context of  growth 
in international  trade. (The agreement  recently reached between  the  EEC  and  46 
countries  in Africa,  the  Car  bbean  and  the Pacific is  a  clear proof  of 
the  Community's  willingness  to make  further  progress  in all questions  \vhich 
concern the  interest of  the  developing  countries) • 
.  VI.  After giving this  summary  picture  of  the  general stance  adopted 
by  the  Community  at  this  moment  when  effective negotiations  begin we  wish 
now  to clarify our  ideas  in each of  the  main  areas  of negotiation.  In doing 
this  we  will  follow carefully the  order of  the  paragraph  3  of  the  Tokyo 
Declaration,  thus  clearly demonstrating  the  importance  we  attach'  to 
it. 
Tariffs  (para  3  (a)  of  Tokyo  Declaration) 
In  the field of tariff negotiation on  industrial products,  what 
should  be  our  objective  and  the  technique  to  the  adopted  ? 
I.  As  regards  the  objective,  our  concept  is  a  simple  one  :  we  should 
aim  towards  haTmoEis cltion  and  :reduction of the tariffs o.f,  at  Jeas  t  ~  the 
main market-economy  countries, these  two  goals  being of  equal  importance. 
As  regards  centrally planned economies,  the  test of real reciprocity shouJ.d 
be  measured  in terms  of overall  economic :results. 
Harmonisation means  for us  a  desire  to reduce  the  high pojnts  vJhich 
in certain tariffs  appear  to  give  an excessive  degree  of protection.  In 
addition,  as  a  result of  the fact  that  the  EEC  has  a  customs  tariff whose 
average  level  is  the  lowest  among  the  principal  participants  e:md  whose 
profile is  extremely  homogeneous,  we  consider that  harmonisation is  the 
only  approach which will  mill(e  it possible  to arrive  at  a  fair  and  balanced 
result.  In .fact,  a  tariff reduction pure  and  simple  would  mean  that  some 
duties  would lose all real value for future  negotiations. 
.;. -----------------------
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Reduction  means  that  we  wish to  harmonise  towards  lower  duty levels,  the 
goal  being  to arrive at  a  substantial diminution of present duties  in the 
tariffs of  the  major  participants.  (In some  cases  the desired goal  will 
be  to obtain also  a  much  higher  degree  of duty bindings  in  order to  give 
an  additional  measure  of balance  in the results of tariff negotiations 
between major  countries). 
II.  As  regards  the  technique  to  be  adopted,  the  basic principle is  that 
the  reduction of  duties  should  be  graduated according  to the  existing duty 
level,  that is,  that the  higher  the duty,  the  deeper  the  cut  should be. 
For  the practicalapplication of this  principle  we  are  in the  process  of 
testing - and  we  are  ready  to  do thi_s jointly with our  partners  - an 
arithmetical  formula  or  a  simple rule which  can  be  applied  as widely  as 
possible  (at least  among  developed countries).  Such  a  formula cannot 
however  be  applied to  agricultural  products,  if only  because  of the fact 
that  there  is  a  vride  spread of different  means  of protection in this  area. 
Naturally,  the  application of this  formula  will  lead  to 
reduction3  which vary  product  by  product,  depending  on  the  existing  d1:tty 
applied.  We  have  looked at  and  tested  a  certain number  of such formulae 
and  vre  are  ready to discuss  them  with  our partners.  But  the  end result  of 
tariff negotiations  should be,  in our view,  a  formula which  leads  to 
greater sjmilarity in  the  tariff profiles of  the  major  developed countries 
for  industrial  products. 
In addition we  would  aim  to achieve  tariff reductions  whereby  higher 
duties,  for  example  over  20  per cent,  would no  longer be  applied.  And 
finally we  envisage  a  minimum  duty level  - which  would  in pratice be  an 
automatic  consequence  of  the formula itself - below which duties  would not 
be  reduced. 
III.  Besides  this  major  goal,  and besides  this principal  technique  to 
be  applied,  we  are  open to individual solutions  which differ somewhat  from 
the  basic rules  : 
- in certain cases,  limited in number,  and  when  economic  circumstances 




to arrive at total elimination of duties  - in the context  of specific 
agreements; 
in a  fe-vT  other cases,  which  involve  products  supplied mainly  by 
developing countries  and  which benefit from  generalised preferences, 
we  expect  to discuss  with our  partners,  the  possibility of not  reducing 
existing duties  (to maintain preference margins)  or of reducing  them 
but  in a  different  timescale. 
Non-tariff barriers  (para  3(b)  of  Tokyo  Declaration) 
I.  In this  complex,  wide-ranging  and varied sector of negotiation  -vre 
follow certain simple  principles  : 
the  impossibility of  any universal  solutions  of  a  general  character  and 
the  need for  a  case  by  case  approach; 
the  need  to select  the  types  of measures  which  should  be  negotiated,  in 
particular those  \vhich  create the  greatest obstacles  to internatio"1al 
trade; 
vlhere  multilateral solutions  can  be  envisaged,  the  need for  these  to  be 
recognized  and  adopted by  as  many  countries  as  possible; 
the desirability in certain cases  of  confining the benefits  of  these 
solutions  to those  countries  that participate; 
the need for suitable mechanisms  for  consultation and for settlement 
of disputes; 
finally,  the  probable  need for  some  mechanism for  applying sanctions  in 
appropriate  cases. 
II.  It would  also  be  useful  in our view to set up  a  procedure for  disCl)_S·--· 
sion and  consultation in order  to  avoid or  mimimise  the effe:ts  that future 
legislative actions  (which may  have  legitimate objectives  and  intentions, 
such  as environment  protection)  could  have  on  trade flows,  effects which 
may  be  of  an  indirect nature  but  nonetheless  significant  and  serious. 
This  seems  nov/  to  be  at least  as  important  as  the  solution of this  or  that 
specific non-tariff barrier problem,  since it is  a  question of securing  the 
future. - 6  -
III.  How  should we  now  move  to  the  phase  of  applying  these  general 
principles  ?  A certain number  of subjects  are  already under  discussion, 
some  have  been discussed over  a  long period.  For  example  countervailing 
duties,  where  we  wishsimply to achieve  an  alignment  of  the  laws  of all 
contracting parties,  and  of their administrative practices,  towards  the 
rules  and  provisions  laid down  in Article  VI  of  GATT;  a  second  example 
being standards,  where  the  EEC  is ready  to discuss,  on  the basis  of real 
reciprocity,  a  greater measure  of international discipline. 
On  these  points  and  others  already under discussion the  EEC  is 
ready to join in negotiations.  In this  context  we  shall  be  watching 
particularly for  the  problems  which  may  arise for  those  countries  with 
federal  structure. 
IV.  To  be  even more  pragmatic,  vJe  believe that 
- we  should  attempt  to make  progress  on all the subjects  studied so far,  vit 
a  view to making  a  general  revie1v of  progress  at  the  end  of severa1  monUJ'": 
- each  participant  should,  as  soon  as  possible,  indicate its list of priorit 
ies  in the  light of  the  barriers maintained  by others  which  in its view  ,.,r] 
create  the  worst  difficulties for  trade,/~t a  later stage  a  J.ist  of  the 
barriers it maintains  1..rhich  it would  be  prepared to negotiate.  Here  the 
the  Community  will  present  quite  soon  the list of barriers  which it 
considers  to  be  priorities for negotiation. 
. I. 
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SECTOR NEGOTIATIONS (Paragraph 3  C  of the Tokyo Declaration) 
As stated in the Tokyo Declaration, this is a  "complementary 
technique". Therefore one should envisage resorting to this technique after 
discussions have sufficiently progressed on general formulae for tariff reduction. 
Besides, only a  limited number of sectors will lend themselves to this exercise. 
We will not be opposed to starting or pursuing methodological,  economic and 
statistical studies in this field,  but we remain of the view that this should be a 
complementary technique. 
Safeguard CLAUSE  (Paragraph 3d  of the Tokyo Declaration) 
According to the Tokyo Declaration, the negotiations should 
include"  an examination of the adequacy of the multilateral safeguard system, 
considering particularly the modalities of application of Article XIX,  with a  view 
to furthering trade liberalization  and  preserving its results". 
We maintain our adhesion to this text, and the EEC remains 
attached to the present provisionsof the General Agreement,  while we admit that 
the modalities of application of Article XIX could be improved. Improved in what 
sense ?  In the sense of seeking a  degree of flexibility along with a  better international 
surveillance and discipline. 
But, to be logical,  we consider that our work should progress 
both in the direction of trade liberalization and in the direction of improving the 
functionning of the safeguard clause, because of the obvious relationship between 
these two aspects. AGRICULTURE  (Paragraph  3 e) of the Tokyo Declaration) 
I  The Tokyo Declaration mentions the "special characteristics and 
problems in this sector". 
The recent developments in production and trade demonstrate 
that the economics of agriculture are by nature subject to variations  - especially 
in production - which in  turn  lead to variations on the world markets and therefore 
in trade. This is an essential characteristic of the "specificity" of the agricultural 
sector. 
II  Having this in mind,  the EEC considers that the approach to the 
negotiations should aim primarily  to create - while respecting  existing policies -
the conditions for a  better adapted supply,  which would make possible an evolution 
of world markets more satisfactory both to importers and exporters. 
Ill  In practice, this means in our opinion a  series  of complementary 
actions which can be summed up as follows  : 
i) First, in order to facilitate an orientation of resources of production which 
could be adequate to the fo<trcseeable evolution in consumption, the EEC considers 
it essential that we engage in a  systematic and regular exchange of information  , 
on the basis of which a  periodical analysis of the situation coula be undertaken 
in common,  so that each government can draw for itself the necessary indications 
for the conduct of its ovm policy. 
The World Food Conference has recognized the need to reinforce the 
existing mechanism.  The EEC considers that all participants to these negotiations 
should conunit themselves to collaborate in the implementation of these resolutions. 
ii) Secondly, for the main products which are essential for human food consumption 
and which are determining factors in maintaining a  balance in the agricultural 
sector,  - such as cereals, rice, sugar and the most homogeneous dairy products -
we believe that international agreements should be negotiated.  Their mechanisms, 
which would have to be adapted to the characteristics of the market for each product, 
should be geared to prevent the inevitable imbalances of the market due to the 
inherent fluctuations in production. 
These mechanisms should, in appropriate cases, cover a  concerted 
stockpiling policy which,  while facilitating the implementation of food aid programs, -9-
would aim at absorbing quantities in excess or, in case of shortage, at maintaining 
an adequate supply of the market. 
These mechanisms should be accompanied by a  price poviaon, the 
stabilizing function of which wbuld be s~ngthened by the stockpiling policy.  On 
the other hand, the price pomions would, in certain respects, play a  role in 
triggering stockpiling or de-stocking actions . 
iii) For other important products which do not seem likely to become the subject of 
international agreements,  we believe concerted disciplines should be negotiated 
between exporters and importers,  so as to ensure that the operations on the 
world market are conducted in an orderly manner. 
iv) Finally, for products whikh  are protected by tariffs, we think reciprocal tariff 
reductions will have to be negotiated. 
IV  AH this proves, may I mention in passing, that contrary to 
what some may say or think the EEC does not envisage exclusively to negotiate 
intc.rnational agreements.  We do not exclude from our approach any of the products 
contained in the 2!:" first chapters of the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature.  The Tokyo 
Declaration states in its par<igraph 4 that the negoti"ations shall cover all pl'Oducts  ~ 
we remain faithful to that text. ----------------------;--
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TROPICAL  PRODUCTS  (Paragraph 3  f  of the  Tokyo Declaration) 
I.  The  Tokyo  Declaration refers to this sector as  a  "special and  priority" 
one.  In  agreement  with our negotiating partners and  recognizing this priority 
we  are  ready to set  up  a  group with the  task of negotiating in this sector. 
We  think it would  be useless,  at this  juncture,  to start a  probably 
fruitless discussion  on  a  definition of tropical  products which  are to 
be negotiated in this  group,  and  we  think it  preferable to  star~the 
negotiations  proper  on  the basis  of lists or requests  to  be  presented 
by developing  countries both to industrialized countries as  a  whole  and 
to these latter countries taken individually.  This  procedure will allow 
us  to discuss  concrete possibilities for the negotiations in this 
sector - possibly  by means  of offer lists or,  alternatively,  of  proposals 
for a  multilateral action,  for instance in the direction of  commodity 
agreements  - and  thus  ensure  an effective priority in this sector. 
II.  The  special  treatment  of tropical  products must,  at the  same  time, 
be  as realistic as  possible,  in order to ensure  the efficiency of  our 
continued work. It should  therefore:,  like all the v10rk  on  individual 
sectors,  be  closely linked  to  the negotiations as  a  whole,  and 
take into  accou."lt  the  elements  of  competitiveness  and  interchangeability 
with non-tropical  products~  in  the framework  of  the agricultural  approach~ 
as well  as  the other elements  relating to this sector  including those  that 
relate to the work  of other international fora. ------------------~-------------------------------
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EXPORI'  RESTRICTIONS  OR  ACCESS  TO  SUPPLIES 
I  come  now  to a  problem which,  as  I  mentioned  in my  introduction, 
has  come  to the forefront  :  that  of  export restrictions  or access  to 
supplies.  This  concern is now  so  vlidespread  that it is reflected in the 
work  and discussions  of  many  fora.  The  problem is real,  and  the negotiations 
cannot  ignore it. 
We  are  aware  of  the  co:mplexi ty of  the  problem due  to a  series of 
factors  :  the lack of international disciplines;  the variety of  situationst 
product  by  product,  or country by  country;  the  legitimate wish  of developing 
countries to add  value to their raw materials  by  processing  on  the  spots 
In order to deal  with these various difficulties,  we  think  our 
approach  should  be  step by step and  pragmatic.  As  a  starting point,  we 
consider that  the international rules  and  disciplines applicable to import 
restrictions  should also apply to export  restrictions  :  an  export 
restriction after all is an obstacle to trade  of the  same  nature as  an 
import  restriction.  Hereover the interdependence  betv1een  our  economies 
makes it necessary to avoid  sudden  and artitrary interruptions of trade 
flows;  ve  '~houl d  explore  together the  v1ay Lo  achieving  a  cormnon  set  of 
rules  of conduct  and  consultation  commitments. 
STRUCTURES  FOR  THE  NEGOTIATIONS 
The  agenda  of  our meeting  raises the question of  how  we  are  going 
to negotiate,  i.e. what  should  be  the structures for the negotiations. 
The  EEC  has  a  clear position  on  this subject  which  has  been stated 
in this  Committee  in February  1974,  and  I  do not need  to repeat it. AU  COfliiTE  Dl!."'S  NEGOCIATION:J  COl.WiERCIALI~3 
INTHODUCTION 
LUYTEN,  Chef  de la D~l~gation ~ Geneve 
I  - Ce  11  fcvrier  est un anniversaire.  Il y  a  tres exactement 
3  ans,  dans  une  declaration commune,,  la Communaute  europ6cnne  et  les 
Etats-Unis  s'eng8.r1'eaient  a "commencer  et  appuyer activement  des  nec;o-
ciations mul tilaterales de  vaste portee dans le cadre  du G  .A.T .'1'."• 
(Deux  jours auparavant,  le 9 fevrier 1972,  le Japan et  les Eiats-Unis 
avaient  declare  en  commun  qu'ils prenaient  le meme  engagement.) 
Trois annees  ont  passe  durant  lesquelles un  certain nombre 
d'obstacles ont  du etre surmontes.  Il a  fallu notu.mment  aitcndre la 
p~·esentation,  la discussion et le vote  du Trade  Act.  I1a  Communaut8  GO 
felicite g:ue  ce vote soit maintenant  acquis  car ccla permet ala phase 
effective des negociations de  s'engat;er,  con1r.1c  le prtSvoyait  let  d~cla­
ration ministerielle de  Tokyo,  que la Communautc,  est-il tosoin de  lc 
SO'..lli~~ner 1  considere toujours  comme  la base  cornmuncmcnt  acrec'e  de  cet te 
ne~ociation. 
II ..;  Depuis trois ans,  cependant,  des  chanGements  profondf;  de  la 
situation economiquc  internationale  sor1L  ih·tE:l'venus.  A p<J.di1·  (lc;  19'{2, 
1 es  ~.csordres moneiaires  se  sont  accentues et la declaration de  Tokyo  y 
fait reference.  N  ous  souhai  tons que  les decisions recentes  du  F' ~Iil. I. 
ouvrent  la voie  d'une veritable reforr.lC  du  systeme  monGtu.iru  internation<ll. 
A partir de  1973,  d 1autra; chanGements  sont  u.pparus,  noto.mrnent 
sur les marches  des procluits  de  base,  soumis  a  d'arnplcs  fluctuations  de 
prix et a des initiatives spectaculaircs de  groupcs  de  pays producteut·s. 
Par suite de 1'  evolution du march6 petrolier,  de  nombreux  pays  ont  eu  ~~ 
affronter de  eraves problcmes  de  balance des paiements. 
III - Taus  ces changements  doivent  etre pris en  compte  d<~ns  lcs 
negociations mais  sans qu' il soi  t  port0 atteinte a nos  eneagernents ini  -;;iaux • 
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Au  contraire,  de l'avis de  la Communautc,  nous  devons  redoubler d'efforts 
pour preserver et am{Hiorer  des relations mondiales  d  1 ochnnGes  aussi 
libres et ouvertes que  possible.  A cet  eeard,  cette noeociation est 
importante en  soi, ·par le seul fait  qu1elle est  engagce  et qu1elle 
servira ainsi de  "dissuasion"  (deterrent)  aux tendances a l'isolation-
nisme et au protectionnisme. 
i 
La  C.E.E.  confirme  son attachement a de  telles relations mondiales 
d 1echanges libres et ouvertes,  ainsi qu'aux disciplinroet procedures 
internationales du G.A.T.T. En  par:ticulier,  nous  resions  attachrSs a la noti01 
de  r6ciprocit6  globale qui  doit  cJnstituer la base  de  ces  nc~ociations entre 
les principaux partenaires industrialiscs. 
IV  - Cortes,  la ponderation relative des problcmes  a  un peu  chanc:;c. 
Depuis la fin de la 2e  guerre mondiale,  nous nous ctions  habitus~::: a pen:::er 
en termes d 111acces  aux marches",  Cile  recherche  de  debouch!!:::;  rnaintcnant 
le problema  de la necuritc  des  approvisionnemcnt> en mati(;res premieres 
et  en energie est au moins  aussi  important.  Sur lc plan alirncntaire, 
nous  sollliDCs  passes d 1unc  periode  d 1 execs  de  1 1 offre Globalc par  rappoc·t 
a la demande  Globale a une  situation quclque  pcu invcrc6c et  en  tout  ca~ 
on  peut  constater une  insuffisance de  l'offre par  rapport  .i la dcmande 
dans  un certain nombre  de  secteurs.  Ce  sont  deux  exemples notablcn,  mai:::; 
il y  en a  d'autres. 
V - Nous  pensons done  qu1une  eventuellc "actualisation"  du  cadre 
des negociations  serait nccessaire  sans modifier leurs objectifs  fonda-
mental~.  Autrement  dit,  la  Commun~ute estimc  que  l 1objectif d'une libe-
ralisation ct  d
1une  expansion ulterieure des  echanges  sera plus  facilcrnent 
atteint si  ces ncGociations  commerciales multilaterales  ne  situcnt  dans 
•  I 
un  cadre  global d'actions internationales visant a surmonter la crise 
actuelle  de  l'economie mondialeo 
A cet cgard,  comment  ne pas 6voquer lcs debats  qui  se deroulent  au 
vont  se derouler au cours des mois  qui  vieirnent  dans d'autrcs enccintes 
oil  taus les pays  commer9ants  mais plus  specialement les pays  en  voic  de 
developpernent  ant  des intedHs fondamcntaux a dCifendrc  ?  La  Communautc 
reaffirme que  cos pays  sont  des partcnaires de  plein droit  dans  cer; 
negociations.  Ils ont  la l 1occasion d 1apportcr leur contribution au bon 
doroulement  des operations  du  commerce  international et a non  cxpQ!lsion, 
sans que  cette contribution soit  incompu.tible  avec  lcs besoins  de  leur: 
developpe:ncnt  .•  La  c.B .. E.  cot  d  I autre  p~lrt  dCitcrminCic  a.  rechercher toutes 
I 
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les solutions susceptibles d'ameliorer effectivement  la situation cconomique 
et les echanges  des pays  en voie  de  developpement  dans le cadre  de  l'expan-
sion des  echanges  internationaux. I!IL' accord tout  reccmmcnt  intervenu entre 
elle et  46  pays d'Afrique,  des  Caraibes et du Pacifique est  uu1c  mani-
festation tangible de la volqnte  communautaire  d'nller toujours plus 
' 
de  l'avant en tout  ce qui  touche  nux  interats des pays  en voie  de  devc-
loppement .g 
VI  - Apres  avoir brosse un tableau  sommaire  de~ orientations 
generales adoptees par la Communaut8  au moment  de  l'ouvcrture effective 
des negociations,  il nous  reste a preciser nos  idees  sur  chacun des 
grands  secteurs de  la negociation.  Nous  le ferons  en  suivant  scrupulcuse-
ment  1 'ordre du paragraphe 3  de  la declaration do  'l'okyo,  ce  qui  manifest e-
ra une  fois de  plus notre attachement ala lettrc corrune  a l'esprit de 
cette declaration. 
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TARIFS  (paragraphe 3  a)  de  la declaration de Tokyo) 
Dans  le domaine  des negociations tarifaires sur les produits 
industriels,  quel  objectif devons-nous  fixer et quellc technique  devons-nous 
· appliquer ? 
I  S'agissant  de  l'objectif,  nos  idees  sont  simples  :  il nous 
faut  tendre  a  !'harmonisation et ala reduction des tarifs au mains 
entre les principaux pays  a  econornie  de  marche,  ces  deux objectifs ctant 
d'egale  importance.  Pour ce  qui  est  des pays  a  economic  planifiee,  la rcci-
procite  effective devra  ~tre appreciee  en  terrnes economiques  globnux. 
Harmonisation,  cela  si~ifie que  nous  voulons reduire  cc  qui  dans 
le profil  de  certains tarifs apparait  comme  des "pointes"  de protection 
excessive.  Par ailleurs,  dans la mesure  meme  ou la C.E.E.  possede le ta1'if 
douanier de niveau moyen  le plus bas parmi les grandes entites commer-
ciales,  et presentant le profil le plus homo5ene,  la C.E.B.  considcre  que 
l'harmonisa:tion est la seule approche  qui  permette d'aboutir a des  r8sultats 
equitables et equilibrcs.  En  effet,  une  reduction pure  et  simple priverait 
certains tarifs de  toute valeur siG!lificaLive  pour  des nc0ociations ult.:rieurc:• 
Hcduction,  cela sienifie que nous  voulons harmoniser vers le bas, 
l'objectif ctant d'aboutir a une bnisse  sie:,'11ificative  des droits de 
douane  actuels d.::ms  les tarifs des  pays  important s. (D.:cns  certains  can 
l 1object:i.f souhaite  sera d'arriver a un  deer!)  beaucoup  plus elev-5  de 
consolidation des droits de  douane  afin d'assurer la aussi  un  rcnultat 
plus equilibre parmi  les pays les plus importants.) 
II - S'ae;issant  de la technique,  le principc est  que  ln reduction 
doit etre modulee  en  fonction  du niveau actuel  des droits c'est-a-dire que 
plus un droit est  8leve,  plus la reduction doit etre forte.  Pour la mise 
en  oeuvre  de  ce principe,  nous  sommes  en train de  rechercher - ct  nous 
semmes  prets a  rechcrcher en  commun- une  formule  arithmctique  ou  une 
tecru1ique  simple,  d'application generale  (au moins  entre tous les pays 
developpes).  Une  telle formule ne pourra cependant  pas  s'appliquer aux. 
produits agricolcs,  ne  serait-ce que  du fait  de la diversitc des  moyens 
de  protection utilises. 
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Bien entendu,  !'application de  cette formule  ou technique  conduira 
a  des  reductions qui varieront  de produit  a  produit,  et de tarif a tarif. 
Nous  avons  etudie et teste un certain,nombre  de telles formules.  Nous 
semmes  pr~ts ales discuter avec nos partenaires.  Mais  l'aboutissement 
des negociations doit  ~tre, pour nous,  une  formule  qui  rapproche  les rrofilscrs 
tarifs douaniers industriels des principaux pays  developpes. 
De  plus,  nous  souhaitons aboutir a  des  reductions telles qu'il 
n.'y aurait plus de  droit  de  douane  exorbitant,  superieur par excmple  a  20  }~. 
Enfin,  nous prevoyons aussi un  seuil 
de la formule  de  reduction  elle-m~me 
seront pas reduits. 
T 
qui  decoule  spontancment d'ailleurs 
au-dessous duquel  les droits ne 
III - A c8te  de  cet objectif principal,  et a c8te  de  cette technique 
majeure,  nous n'excluons pas des  solutions particulieres qui  s'en ecartcnt, 
en plus  ou  en moins  : 
- Clans  certains cas,  ~;o-..~;~..:!t';:i'E!i  limitet:t,  et  lorsque len conditions 
economiques le  justifient,  nous  pouvons  envisaGer d'aller nlu8  loin, 
c'est-a-dire  jusqu'a l'(Himination des droits,  dans  le cadre  d'un  accorci. 
specifique; 
-dans un nombre  limit;j  de  cas,  et  s'agissant  de  produits  fourni~; 
en majori  te par des pays  en  voic  de  D6veloppement,  bcncficiant  du  syst~:me 
de preferences genoralisees,  nous  cnvisa,seons  de  discuter avec  nos parte-
naires la possibilite ou bien de  ne  pas reduire les droits actuels,  pour 
conserver la marge  de  preferences,  ou bien de  les reduire  selon un  calen-
drier different. 
OBSTACLES  NON  TAHIFAIHES  (parae-raphe 3  b)  de  la declaration de  'l'okyo) 
I  -Dans ce  secteur complexe,  vaste  et multiforme,  nous  sommes 
guides par des  idees  simples  : 
- il est  impossible  de  trouver des  solutions generales et il faut 
done  rechercher des  solutions cas par cas; 
- il est necessaire  de  faire un  choix des  mesures  sur lesquelleB 
portera la nogociation,  en prenant  celles qui  sont  les plus Gcnantes  pour 
les echane;cs  internationaux; 
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- lorsque des  solutions  multilatc~ales sont  envisa0oables,  il 
faudra les faire admettre  et adopter par le plus grand nombre  possible 
de  pays; 
il conviendra de  limiter,  dans  certains cas,  le benefice  de 
ces solutions aux pays participants; 
il sera necessaire d'etablir des  mecanismes  approprics  de  consul-
tation et de  reglement  des litiges; 
- enfin,  il faudra eventuellement prevoir un  systeme  de  sanctions 
dans les cas appropries. 
II - Il serait tout aussi utile, a nos yeux,  de  mettre  en place 
une procedure  de  dialo,~e et  de  consultation permcttant d'eviter ou 
d'attcnuer les effets que  dec legislations futurcn  (qui  peuvent  avoir un 
objet et  illlC  intention  lc~itimes tels que  la protection UC  l'cnvirorule-
ment)  pourraient  avoir  sur les cchanges  commcrciau.'C 1  de  manit::rc  incidcnLc 
peut-~tre,  mais notable et  serieuse.  Cela nous paratt au moins  aussi 
important que  la solution de  tel  ou tel problf>me  spucifique,  car il 
s'agit de  l'avenir. 
III - Comment  passer a la phase  de  mise  en  oeuvre  de  ces  idees ? 
Un  certain nombre  de  sujcts  sont  d(;)ja  en  cour·s  de  discuflsion,  cc~rtain~:; 
depuis  longtemps.  Il s'agit par  excmple  des droits compensateurs  ou nous 
voulons  obtenir que  toutes les parties contractantes aligncnt leurs legis-
lations et leurs pra.tiques  sur les principes et  les dispositions  du 
G.A.T.T.  (article VI);  il s'agit  d~s normes,  ou la C.E.E.  est dispos6e 
a discuter d'une plus grande  discipline internationale,  sur base  de  rcci-
procite effective. 
Sur ces points et  sur ceux qui  sont  dej~1.  en  cours  de  discussion, 
la C.E.E.  est prete a participer aux negociations.  A cet  c:.;ard,  nous 
serons attentifs aux problemas que  peuvent poser les pays a structure 
federale. 
IV  - Pour etre encore plus pratiques,  nous pensons  que  : 
- nous  devrions  essayer de  faire progresser les  tr~vaux sur 
!'ensemble des  themes  etudios,  en vue  de  faire le point  a terme  de 
quelques rnois,  pour voir l'etat d'avancement; - 1  -
- chacun devrait aussi rapidement  que  possible indiquer sa liste 
de priorites en  fonction des obstacles qu'il estime genants chez  les 
autres et eventuellement  de  ceux qu' il est pr(h a rnettre  en  ne,~ociation. 
A cet  egard,  la C.E.E.  indiquera en temps utile la liste des  problemes 
qu'elle considere prioritaires. 
NIDOCIA'riONS  SECTOHIELLES  (paragraphe  3  c)  de  la declaration de  ~'ok:yo) 
Comme  le dit la declaration de Tokyo,  il s'aGit la d'une 
technique d'appoint.  11  convient  done  de  prevoir  son utilisation 6ventuelle 
apres  que les discussions aient  suffisamrnent  avancc  sur les focmules  ou 
techniques generales de  reduction tarifaire.  Au  reste,  V'n8Ji8e1Rtr}l:ebleltl61'\t, 
seul  un nombre  limite  de  secteurs s'y preteront.  Hous  ne  nous  opposerons 
done  pas a ce  que  des etudes methodologiques,  6conomir;ues  et  statistiques 
soient  entreprises ou poursuivies dans  ce  domaine,  mais  nous  coni.inuons a 
considerer _cette  technique  corrune  une  simple  technique d' appoint. 
CLAUSE  m~ SAUVF.'GAHDE  (paragraphe 3  d)  de  la declaration de  Tokyo) 
Selon la declaration de  Tokyo,  la ne;;ociation  cornportC::r.::L  un  "examen 
du  der,r6  d'ads;quation du  systome multilat6I'cil  de  ::;auvec;ardc,  aycmt  lee 
mod.::Llites  d'<::P..P)ication  de  l'article XIX  en vue,  pour  facilite!' lu libc!-
ration des  echanges et  en P-reserver les resultats". 
Nous  restons absolument  fidcles a  ce texte car la  C.E;.l<~.  dcrneurt:: 
attachee aux dispositions actuelles de  l'Accord gc)n8ral,  tout  en  adrncttant 
que  los rnodalitcs d'application de  l'articlc XIX  peuvent  atre am6lior6es. 
Ameliorces  dans  qucl  sens ?  Celui a la fois d'une plus  grande  souplc::;r;c 
d'utilisation et  d'une meilleure  surveillance et discipline  internation~lcs. 
Ivlais,  pour etre lociques,  nous  estimons que  nor3  travaux  doi  vent 
porter aussi bien sur la libcralisation des  6chant;es  que  sur l'arnelioration 
du  fonctionnement  de  la· clause  de  sauvegarde,  en  raison du lien  ~vident 
entre ces  deux  domaines. 
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AGRICULTURE  (paragraphe  3  e)  de  la declaration  de  Tokyo) 
I.  La  declaration  de  Tokyo  fait  reference  "aux caructeris-
tiques speciales et aux  problemes  de  ce  secteur". 
Les  recents  evenements  au  niveau  de  1~ production  et 
des  echanges  montrent  que  l'economie  du  sectcur  a~ricolc est sujctte 
·par nature  ~  des  variations  de  production,  elles-m@mes  ~6n~ratrices de 
situations  extrSmes  au  niveau  des  marches  mondiaux  et  p~r cons6qucnt 
des  echanges.  C'est li une  caract&ristique  esscr1lielle  de  la  sp6cificit6 
du  secteur agricole. 
II.  Compte  tenu  de  ce  qui  precede,  du  point  de  vue  de  l~ 
Communaute,  l
1 a~rroche des  negociations  dans  le secteur  u~r·icole devr3jl 
viser  essentiellement  ~ cr6er,  dans  le  respect  des  politiqucs existantes, 
les conditions  d'un approvisionnement  mieux  adapt&,  permcltunt  unc 
evolution  des  marches  mondiaux  qui  soi  t  plus sat  i;; faisan tc  pour  les 
importatcurs  et  pour  les  exportateurs. 
III.  En  pratique,  cela  si1_;nifie  pour  1a  Com~<:unau  t.0,  un 
ensemble  d 1 u.ctions  complernen taires  que  1 1 on  peut  rl:Gumer  co•r.u1e  sui  L 
(i)  Afin  tout  d 1abord  de  permettrc  une  orientution  deG 
ressources  de  production,  d 1une  fa<;on  ad·~quat.e  pnr  ruppor·t  £i  l 1 f:volul.ion 
previsible  de' la  consommation,  la  Comr.JUnaute  con:.:.;idere  corrl!uc  c:.:>senl:ic:l 
de  proceder a un  echange  systematique et  r&r;ulic:r  d
1 jnfoi'l:Jat.ion:..;  ::;<Jr 
base  dcsquel1es  une  analyse  periodique  de  1~ situation pourruit  &tre 
effectuee  en  commun  afin que  cl1aquc  gouvernement  puisDc  en  degat;cr, 
pour  son  compte,  des  indications  pour  la  conduite  de  sa  politique. 
La  Conference  l1londiale  de  1 1 /,limen tu tion  a  reconnu  J a 
necessit~ de  renforcer les  dispositifs  et  mecanismes  actuels.  La  Commu-
naute  estime  que  1
1 engage~ent devrait  &tre  pri3  par les parties  aux 
Ne~ociations  ~ 1 apporter leur collaboration  pour  l 1application  de  ces 
resolutions. 
(ii)  En  second  lieu,  pour  les  grands  rrvJuits  qui  jouent  un 
r6le  esscntiel  dans  l 1a1imerltation  humaine  et  qui  sont  d6tcrminnnts 
pour  l
1equilibre  du  sectcur agricole  - tcls les  c6r~alca,  le  riz,  le 
sucre  et les  produits  laitiers lea  plus  homog~nes  - de:..;  nccordo  intcrn~­
tionaux  devraient  @tre  nbgoci6s,  dont  les  m~cnnismcs,  qui  seraient 
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adapt&s  aux  caruct~ristiques du  march&  de  chaque  produit  concerne, 
I 
devraient  permettre  de  fa ire  face  aux  inevi tables  d•~sf'~qu ilibres du 
marche  dus  aux  fluctuations  inh&rentes  a la  productjon  :Jc;ricole. / 
o<.~  .<..v.  (:..->  <tt7~  t"~ 
Ces  mecanismes  devraient mettre  en  oeuvreLunc  pol:L tj que 
concertee  de  stockage  qui,  facilitant  en  outre  l'aprlic<..:tion  rle  proq;l'~lm::•· 
d'aide alimcntaire,  viserait  ~ absorber les  quantit~u  exc~dentaires 
ou,  en  cas  de  deficits  1  a assurer  un  approviGionner.Jen t  adcqua l  du  rnarchc. 
Ce  m&canisme  devralt  ~tre assorti  d'un  dispo~itif de  prix 
dont  la  fonction  stabilisatrice devruit  etrc  renforcee  par  la  politiquc 
de  stockage,  et  dont  certains  de  ces  eJements  auruicnt  .~  leur  tour  un 
r81e  conducteur  pour  les mesures  de  Stockage  ou  de  d6stocka~e  ~  prendre. 
(iii) Pour  d'autres  produits  importants  mais  non  ~uscertiblc~ de 
faire  l 1objet  d 1uccords  internationuux,  des  diGciplines  concet·t~cs 
devraien  t  etre  nee;ociees  entre  importa tcurs  et  expor Lrt Lr:u rs  I  a;o;. :ur·:t n t 
que  les operations  realisees sur  les  marches  mondiaux  se  d(~roulerc.nt 
d 1une  mani~re ordonn&e. 
(iv)  Enfin,  pour  lcs  t3UtreG  rrocluits  proteg·~::;  p:Jr  dcr;  L:lr] fr-;, 
~-.J..~.-l"~"Y:'i:·f~t-e;:  d i  -t-=t:-~r-t:R!G  (0) I'  ~~~-;tt"-\'1  I  () f'f~ 
.....o.e~-~  /t.e-o  ,.J.ciM.c~v?  1'\.2-j-<>'-'--i~  J-<.,~--- ~  ;wfvv~ 
IV.  Cela  preuve,  ~oit dit  en  puss~nt,  ct  contrairemcnt  ~  ce 
que  d'aucun·s  disent  ou  pen~cnt,  yue  la  Cornrr,unaute  ne  con:!:c  pas  ~cul<:ment 
i  cbnclurc  des  Accords  int~rnationaux.  EJle  n'exclul  de  son  approche 
aucun  des  produits  des  21-1  premi\::r13  chapitres  de  la  N'l'i1.  La  dl:cL.il'C.tti_un 
de  Tokyo  dispose  en  son  puragra.phe  l1  que  la  n(~gocia  ti.(;l\  _~.;ortcrn  cur 
taus  les produits  la  CE£  est absolument  fid~le  ~  ce  texte. 
PHUDUI'T'S  'I'.RCPICAUX  (pnrae;raphe  > f)  de  la  declaration  de  Tokyo) 
I  - La declarn.tion de  Tokyo  qualifie ce  secteur  de  "uper.ial  et 
prioritaire".  En  accord avec nos partenn.ires et,  rcconnaissant  cctte prio-
rite,  nous  somrncs  pr~ts a.  creer un  groupe  charge  des nc{;'ociations  clans  ce 
sectcur.  Nous  estimons qu'il sera inutile ace stade  d'enga~~cr une  diu-
cussion probablcment  peu fructueuse  sur une  definition des produits tro-
picaux qUi  doi  Vent  etre ncgocieS  dans  CC  f,'rOUpC  et  qUI i]_  Sera  prlSfr~rable 
de  commencer  des necociations proprement  ditcu au moyen  des  licteu 
de  demandcs presentees pn.r  les PVD  a  la fois  a 1'  ensemble  cles  pay::;  d;Sve-
loppes et  a cer;  pays  inrlividucllcmcnt.  Cctte  P"OC(~rlure  perm0~,tra 
de  discuter les poscibilites COncretes pour  les  ll~(;OCia.tions 
..  ;  ~-·--• 
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II - l.e  t>.·ai  t  0·':1e:1t  special  clc;s  procluits tropicaux doi  t  gtre le 
plus  ::.'0a1 i sto possi  0le1  c.fin d 1 a:;::mrer  1 1 efficaci  tc  des  travau.x:  qui  seront 
dans  l'e~semblo  ~~ la n 
proclui.t::::  non  t:co:;-Jicaux  dans  J.·e:  cadre  de  1 1 app!'ocl1e  agricole,  que  de 
,) 1  G:n  o.rr~.'JG  m.-~j ntr,nr..nt  ~~  nn  n!'obl8:'1e  qui1  cor:-.me  je le mentionnai.s 
tion.s  d'o.;..:~Jo·c·to.tion  ou  rle  l';.Lc~;C:s  2.ux  approvisionnernents.  C'est  tme  pr-5-
tont  tl.'18  ;.:fric  d<.:  :ac~8urs  :  :i.:nf_,uffisr:.ncc  cl·::;s  disciplines internationalos; 
c.iversit8  des  cc..:;,  ch  produit  a pnJc1uit  ou  de  p2.ys  a pays;  souhait  ler;iti:r.c 
la trans~orDation  su~ place. 
?our  rer.:ouclre  ces  di.fficul  l.cis  d.e  tous orclrcs,  notre  approche  ne 
pcut  3trc  que  pr-c~~.!'css:i.vc  ot  pragmatiqueo  Au  depart,  nous consid6rons  que 
lc:s  r·ct:J·~s  et  di.sc:ir>l inc;;  applica·ulcs  aux restrictions d' importation d.e-
vraicnt  ;jtre  <S,::;c.L:c-.my~  t!.ppl i.calJJ.cs  2ux:  restrictions  d 
1 exportation  :  'WlC 
restriction a 1! <::X);Ol'tation  consti  tuc  un  obctacle  aux.  echanijCS  cle  ffi~;IlC 
nature  qu  1tme  rc::ot:riction a l  I importation.  Par ailleurs,  l'  intcrd6pcndance 
tle  nos  economies  rend necessairc  d. 1evitcr des  interruptions soudaincs  et 
a.rbitr<~ircs des  courant;;  d 16chonc.;es;  nous  devons  explorer  ensemble  la voie 
qui  conduit  a  un  cnsernbJ.c  de  rcGles  de  bonne  conduite  ct  J.'cncas;ernenta  do 
concultntion. 
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•' '(S'l'RUCTUR1S  DE  N.LGOCIATION 
L'ordre  du  jour  de  notre  reunion  pose  la  quf:Stion  : 
comment  nous  allons  negocier,  c'estra-dire  les :>tructurcs  de  Il·~t;oci_~.tion. 
La  CEE  a  une  position claire  ~  ce  sujet  qui  n  d&j~  ~t6 
exposee  au  Comite,  en  fevrier  1974,  et  je n'ai  pas  be:.>oin  de  la  rioetcr. 